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1MIMO Beamforming for Secure and
Energy-Efficient Wireless Communication
Nguyen T. Nghia1, Hoang D. Tuan1, Trung Q. Duong2 and H. Vincent Poor3
Abstract—Considering a multiple-user multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) channel with an eavesdropper, this letter develops
a beamformer design to optimize the energy efficiency in terms of
secrecy bits per Joule under secrecy quality-of-service constraints.
This is a very difficult design problem with no available exact
solution techniques. A path-following procedure, which iteratively
improves its feasible points by using a simple quadratic program
of moderate dimension, is proposed. Under any fixed compu-
tational tolerance the procedure terminates after finitely many
iterations, yielding at least a locally optimal solution. Simulation
results show the superior performance of the obtained algorithm
over other existing methods.
Index Terms—MIMO beamforming, secure communication,
energy efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication achieved by exploiting the wireless
physical layer to provide secrecy in data transmission, has
drawn significant recent research attention (see e.g. [1]–[3]
and references therein). The performance of this type of se-
cure communication can be measured in terms of the secrecy
throughput, which is the capacity of conveying information to
the intended users while keeping it confidential from eaves-
droppers [2], [4]. On the other hand, energy efficiency (EE)
has emerged as another important figure-of-merit in assessing
the performance of communication systems [5], [6]. For most
systems, both security and energy efficiency are of interest, and
thus it is of interest to combine these two metrics into a single
performance index called the secrecy EE (SEE), which can be
expressed in terms of secrecy bits per Joule.
Transmit beamforming can be used to enhance the two con-
flicting targets for optimizing SEE in multiple-user multiple-
input multiple-output (MU-MIMO) communications: mitigat-
ing MU interference to maximize the users’ information
throughput, and jamming eavesdroppers to control the leakage
of information. However, the current approach to treat both
EE [7], [8] and SEE [9], [10] is based on costly zero-forcing
beamformers, which completely cancel the MU interference
and signals received at the eavesdroppers. The EE/SEE ob-
jective is in the form of a ratio of a concave function and a
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convex function, which can be optimized by using Dinkelbach’s
algorithm [11]. Each Dinkelbach’s iteration still requires a log-
det function optimization, which is convex but computationally
quite complex. Moreover, zero-forcing beamformers are mostly
suitable for low code rate applications and are applicable to
specific MIMO systems only. The computational complexity
of SEE for single-user MIMO/SISO communications as consid-
ered in [12] and [13] is also high as each iteration still involves
a difficult nonconvex optimization problem.
This letter aims to design transmit beamformers to optimize
SEE subject to per-user secrecy quality-of-service (QoS) and
transmit power constraints. The specific contributions are de-
tailed in the following dot-points.
• A path-following computational procedure, which invokes
a simple convex quadratic program at each iteration and
converges to at least a locally optimal solution, is pro-
posed. The MU interference and eavesdropped signals are
effectively suppressed for optimizing the SEE. In contrast
to zero-forcing beamformers, higher code rates not only
result in transmitting more concurrent data streams but
also lead to much better SEE performance in our proposed
beamformer design.
• As a by-product, other important problems in secure and
energy-efficient communications, such as EE maximiza-
tion subject to the secrecy level or sum secrecy throughput
maximization, which are still quite open for research, can
be effectively addressed by the proposed procedure.
Notation. All variables are written in boldface. For illustrative
purpose, f(V) is a mapping of variable V while f(V¯ ) is the
output of mapping f corresponding to a particular input V¯ . In
denotes the identity matrix of size n × n. The notation (·)H
stands for the Hermitian transpose, |A| denotes the determi-
nant of a square matrix A, and 〈A〉 denotes its trace while
(A)2 = AAH . The inner product 〈X,Y 〉 is defined as 〈XHY 〉
and therefore the Frobenius squared norm of a matrix X is
||X||2 = 〈XXH〉. The notation A  B (A  B, respectively)
means that A − B is a positive semidefinite (definite, respec-
tively) matrix. E[·] denotes expectation and <{·} denotes the
real part of a complex number. CN (0, a) denotes a circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with mean zero
and variance a.
II. SEE FORMULATION
Consider a MIMO system consisting of D transmitters and
D users indexed by 1, . . . , D. Each transmitter j is equipped
with N antennas to transmit information to its intended user j
equipped with Nr antennas. There is an eavesdropper equipped
with Ne antennas, which is part of the legitimate network [1],
[4]. The channel matrices H`j ∈ CNr×N and H`e ∈ CNe×N
2from transmitter ` to user j and to the eavesdropper, respec-
tively, are known at the transmitters by using the channel
reciprocity, feedback and learning mechanisms [1], [4], [14],
[15].
A complex-valued vector sj ∈ Cd1 contains the information
transmitter j intends to convey to user j, where E
[
sjs
H
j
]
=
Id1 , and d1 ≤ N is the number of concurrent data streams.
Denote by Vj ∈ CN×d1 the complex-valued beamformer
matrix for user j. The ratio d1/N is called the code rate of
Vj . For notational convenience, define D , {1, . . . , D} and
V , [Vj ]j∈D.
The received signal at user j and the signal received at the
eavesdropper are
yj = HjjVjsj +
∑
`∈D\{j}
H`jV`s` + n˜j , (1)
ye =
D∑
j=1
HjeVjsj + n˜e, (2)
where n˜j ∈ CN (0, σ2j ) and n˜e ∈ CN (0, σ2e) are additive
noises.
By (1), the rate of information fj leaked from user j (in
nats) is
fj(V) = ln
∣∣INr + (Lj(Vj))2(Ψj(V) + σ2j INr )−1∣∣ , (3)
where Lj(Vj) , HjjVj and Ψj(V) ,
∑
`∈D\{j}(H`jV`)
2.
On the other hand, the wiretapped throughput for user j at the
eavesdropper is
fj,e(V) , ln
∣∣INe + (Lj,e(Vj))2(Ψj,e(V) + σ2eINe)−1∣∣ , (4)
where Lj,e(Vj) , HjeVj and Ψj,e(V) ,∑
`∈D\{j}(H`eV`)
2. The secrecy throughput in transmitting
information sj to user j while keeping it confidential from the
eavesdropper is defined as [2], [4]
fj,s(V) , fj(V)− fj,e(V). (5)
Following [16], the consumed power for signal transmission
is modelled by P tot(V) , ζP t(V) + Pc, where P t(V) ,∑D
j=1 ||Vj ||2 is the total transmit power of the transmitters
and ζ and Pc are the reciprocal of the drain efficiency of the
power amplifier and the circuit power, respectively.
Consider the following secure beamformer design to opti-
mize the system’s energy efficiency:
max
V
1
P tot(V)
D∑
j=1
(fj(V)− fj,e(V)) s.t. (6a)
||Vj ||2 ≤ Pmax, j ∈ D, (6b)
fj(V)− fj,e(V) ≥ rj , j ∈ D, (6c)
where the constraints (6b) limit the transmit power, while (6c)
are the secrecy QoS constraints.
It can be seen from their definitions (3) and (4) that both
throughput fj and wiretapped throughput fj,e are very compli-
cated functions of the beamformer variable V. The approach
of [7] and [8] (to EE) and [9] and [10] (to SEE) seeks
V in the class of zero-forcing beamformers Ψj(V) ≡ 0,
j ∈ D and ∑`∈D(H`eV`)2 ≡ 0 to cancel completely all the
MU interference and wiretapped signals. Each throughput fj
becomes a log-det function of only Vj . Dinkelbach’s algorithm
is then applied to compute a zero-forcing solution of (6), which
requires a log-det function optimization for each iteration.
Such optimization is still computationally difficult with no
available polynomial-time solvers. Note that the feasibility
of the zero-forcing constraints imposes N ≥ Ne + d1 and
D(N + Nr − Ne − 2d1) ≥ (D − 1)d1 [10]. Thus, there is
not much freedom for optimizing zero-forcing beamformers
whenever N is not large.
In the next section, we will provide a completely new
computational approach to (6) by effectively enhancing its
difficult objective and constraints.
III. PATH-FOLLOWING COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE
By introducing a variable t satisfying the convex quadratic
constraint
ζ
D∑
j=1
||Vj ||2 + PBS ≤ t, (7)
the optimization problem (6) can be equivalently expressed as
max
V,t
P(V, t) , 1
t
D∑
j=1
(fj(V)− fj,e(V)) s.t. (6b), (6c). (8)
In what follows, a function h is said to be a minorant (majorant,
resp.) of a function f at a point x¯ in the definition domain
dom(f) of f iff h(x¯) = f(x¯) and h(x) ≤ f(x) ∀ x ∈ dom(f)
(h(x) ≥ f(x) ∀ x ∈ dom(f), resp.) [17].
By [18], a concave quadratic minorant of the throughput
function fj(V) at V (κ) , [V (κ)j ]j∈D, which is feasible for
(6b)-(6c) is
Θ
(κ)
j (V) , a
(κ)
j +2<{A(κ)j ,Lj(Vj)〉}−〈B(κ)j ,Mj(V)〉, (9)
where Mj(V) , Ψj(V) + (Lj(Vj))2, 0 > a(κ)j ,
fj(V
(κ)) − 〈(Lj(V (κ)j ))H(Ψj(V (κ)) + σ2j INr )−1Lj(V (κ)j )〉 −
σ2j 〈(Ψj(V (κ))+σ2j INr )−1− (Mj(V (κ))+σ2j INr )−1〉, A(κ)j ,
(Ψj(V
(κ)) + σ2j INr )
−1Lj(V (κ)j ) and
0  B(κ)j , (Ψj(V (κ))+σ2j INr )−1− (Mj(V (κ))+σ2j INr )−1.
To provide a minorant of the secrecy throughput fj,s (see (5))
at V (κ), the next step is to find a majorant of the eavesdropper
throughput function fj,e(V) at V (κ). Reexpressing fj,e by
ln
∣∣INe +Mj,e(V)/σ2e ∣∣− ln ∣∣INe + Ψj,e(V)/σ2e ∣∣ , (10)
forMj,e(V) , Ψj,e(V)+(Lj,e(Vj))2, and applying Theorem
1 in the appendix for upper bounding the first term and lower
bounding the second term in (10) yields the following convex
quadratic majorant of fj,e at V (κ):
Θ
(κ)
j,e (V) , a
(κ)
j,e − 2
∑
`∈D\{j}
<{〈H`eV (κ)` VH` HH`e 〉}/σ2e
+〈B(κ)j,e1,Mj,e(V)〉/σ2e + 〈B(κ)j,e2,Ψj,e(V)〉/σ2e ,
where a(κ)j,e , fj,e(V (κ))+〈(INe +Mj,e(V (κ))/σ2e)−1−INe +
Ψj,e(V
(κ))/σ2e〉, and
0  B(κ)j,e1 , (INe +Mj,e(V (κ))/σ2e)−1,
0  B(κ)j,e2 , (σ2e)−1INe − (σ2eINe + Ψj,e(V (κ)))−1.
3A concave quadratic minorant of the secrecy throughput func-
tion fj,s at V (κ) is then
Θ
(κ)
j,s (V) = Θ
(κ)
j (V)−Θ(κ)j,e (V)
= a
(κ)
j,s +A(κ)j,s (V)− B(κ)j,s (V). (11)
Here, a(κ)j,s , a
(κ)
j + a
(κ)
j,e , A(κ)j,s (V) , 2<{〈A(κ)j ,Lj(Vj)〉} +
2
∑
`∈D\{j}<{〈H`eV (κ)` VH` HH`e 〉}/σ2e , and B(κ)j,s (V) ,
〈B(κ)j ,Mj(V)〉+ 〈B(κ)j,e1,Mj,e(V)〉+ 〈B(κ)j,e2,Ψj,e(V)〉/σ2e .
Therefore, the nonconvex secrecy QoS constraints (6c) can
be innerly approximated by the following convex quadratic
constraints in the sense that the feasibility of the former is
guaranteed by the feasibility of the latter:
Θ
(κ)
j,s (V) ≥ rj , j = 1, ..., D. (12)
For good approximation, the following trust region is imposed:
A(κ)j,s (V) ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., D. (13)
By using the inequality
x
t
≥ 2
√
x(κ)
√
x
t(κ)
− x
(κ)
(t(κ))2
t ∀x > 0, x(κ) > 0, t > 0, t(κ) > 0
we obtain A(κ)j,s (V)/t ≥ ϕ(κ)j,s (V, t), for
ϕ
(κ)
j,s (V, t) , 2b
(κ)
j,s
√
A(κ)j,s (V)− c(κ)j,s t (14)
where 0 < b(κ)j,s ,
√
A(κ)j,s (V (κ))/t(κ), 0 < c(κ)j,s , (b(κ)j,s /t(κ))2,
which is a concave function [17].
With regard to a(κ)j,s /t we define a concave function a
(κ)
j,s (t)
as follows:
• If a(κ)j,s < 0, define a
(κ)
j,s (t) , a
(κ)
j,s /t, which is a concave
function;
• If a(κ)j,s > 0, define a
(κ)
j,s (t) = a
(κ)
j,s (2/t
(κ) − t/(t(κ))2),
which is a linear minorant of the convex function a(κ)j,s /t
at t(κ).
A concave minorant of Θ(κ)j,s (V)/t, which is also a minorant
of (fj(V)− fj,e(V))/t at (V (κ), t(κ)), is thus
g
(κ)
j,s (V, t) , a
(κ)
j,s (t) + ϕ
(κ)
j (Vj , t)− B(κ)j,s (V)〉/t. (15)
We now solve the nonconvex optimization problem (6) by
generating the next feasible point (V (κ+1), t(κ)) as the optimal
solution of the following convex quadratic program (QP), which
is an inner approximation [17] of the nonconvex optimization
problem (8):
max
V,t
P(κ)(V, t) ,
D∑
j=1
g
(κ)
j,s (V, t)
s.t. (6b), (7), (12), (13). (16)
Note that (16) involves n = 2DNd1 + 1 scalar real variables
and m = 2D + 1 quadratic constraints so its computational
complexity is O(n2m2.5 +m3.5).
It can be seen that P(V (κ+1), t(κ+1)) ≥
P(κ)(V (κ+1), t(κ+1)) > P(κ)(V (κ), t(κ)) = P(V (κ), t(κ)) as
long as (V (κ+1), t(κ+1)) 6= (V (κ), t(κ)), i.e. (V (κ+1), t(κ+1)) is
better than (V (κ), t(κ)). This means that, once initialized from
a feasible point (V (0), t(0)) for (8), the κ-th QP iteration (16)
Algorithm 1 Path-following Algorithm for SEE Optimization
Initialization: Set κ := 0, and choose a feasible point
(V (0), t(0)) for (8).
κ-th iteration: Solve (16) for an optimal solution
(V ∗, t∗) and set κ := κ + 1, V (κ), t(κ)) ,
(V ∗, t∗) and calculate P(V (κ), t(κ)). Stop if∣∣(P(V (κ), t(κ))− P(V (κ−1)), t(κ−1)) /P(V (κ−1), t(κ−1))∣∣
≤ .
generates a sequence {(V (κ), t(κ))} of feasible and improved
points toward the nonconvex optimization problem (8), which
converges at least to a locally optimal solution of (6) [18].
Under the stopping criterion∣∣∣(P(V (κ+1), t(κ+1))− P(V (κ), t(κ))) /P(V (κ), t(κ))∣∣∣ ≤ 
for a given tolerance  > 0, the QP iterations will terminate
after finitely many iterations.
The proposed path-following procedure for computational
solution of the nonconvex optimization problem (6) is sum-
marized in Algorithm 1.
We note that a feasible initial point (V (0), t(0)) for (8) can
be found by solving
max
V
min
j∈D
(fj(V)− fj,e(V))/rj s.t. (6b)
by the iterations
{
max
V
min
j∈D
Θ
(κ)
j,s (V)/rj s.t. (6b)
}
, which
terminate upon reaching (fj(V (κ))− fj,e(V (κ)))/rj ≥ 1 ∀j ∈
D, to satisfy (6b)-(6c).
The following problem of EE optimization under users’
throughput QoS constraints and secrecy levels:
max
V
1
P tot(V)
D∑
j=1
fj(V) s.t. (6b),
fj(V) ≥ rj & fj,e(V) ≤ , j = 1, ..., D, (17)
where  is set small enough to keep the users’ information
confidential from the eavesdropper, is simpler than (6). It can be
addressed by a similar path-following procedure, which solves
the following QP at the κ−th iteration instead of (16):
max
V,t
D∑
j=1
(
a
(κ)
j /t + 4b
(κ)
j
√
<{〈A(κ)j ,Lj(Vj)〉}
−2c(κ)j t− 〈B(κ)j ,Mj(V)〉/t
)
s.t. (6b), (18a)
<{〈A(κ)j ,Lj(Vj)〉} ≥ 0, j ∈ D, (18b)
Θ
(κ)
j (V) ≥ rj & Θ(κ)j,e (V) ≤ , j ∈ D, (18c)
where 0 < b(κ)j , 〈(Lj(V (κ)j ))H(Ψj(V (κ)) +
σ2j INr )
−1Lj(V (κ)j )〉1/2/t(κ), 0 < c(κ)j , (b(κ)j /t(κ))2
and A(κ)j and B(κ)j are defined from (9). A feasible initial
point (V (0), t(0)) for (17) can be found by solving
max
V
min
j∈D
min{fj(V)− rj , − fj,e(V)} s.t. (6b)
by the iterations
max
V
min
j∈D
min{Θ(κ)j (V)− rj , −Θ(κ)j,e (V)} s.t. (6b)},
4which terminate upon reaching fj(V (κ)) − rj ≥ 0,  −
fj,e(V
(κ)) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ D, to satisfy (6b), (17).
Lastly, the problem of sum secrecy throughput maximization
max
V
D∑
j=1
(fj(V)− fj(V)) s.t. (6b), (6c)
is also simpler than the SEE optimization problem (6), which
can be addressed by a similar path-following procedure with
the QP
max
V
D∑
j=1
Θ
(κ)
j,s (V) s.t. (6b), (12)
solved at the κ−th iteration instead of (16).
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The fixed parameters are: D = 3, N = 12, Nr = 6, Ne = 9,
σj ≡ 1, σe = 1, rj ≡ 1 bits/s/Hz, ζ = 1 and Pc ∈ {7, 10} dB.
The secrecy level  = 0.05/ log2 e is set in solving (17). The
channels are Rayleigh fading so their coefficients are generated
as CN (0, 1).
For the first numerical example, the number of data streams
d1 = 3 is set, so the code rate is 3/12 = 1/4. Each Vj is of size
12× 3. Figure 1 shows the SEE performance of our proposed
beamformer and the zero-forcing beamformer [9], [10]. One
can see that the former outperforms the latter substantially.
Apparently, the latter is not quite suitable for both EE and SEE.
The SEE performance achieved by the formulation (6) is better
than that achieved by the formulation (17) because the secrecy
level is enhanced with the users’s throughput in the former
instead of being constrained beforehand in the latter. When
the transmit power Pmax is small, the denominator of the SEE
objective in (6) and (17) is dominated by the constant circuit
power Pc. As a result, the SEE is maximized by maximizing
its numerator, which is the system sum secrecy throughput.
On the other hand, the SEE objective is likely maximized
by minimizing the transmitted power Pmax in its denominator
when the latter is dominated by Pmax. That is why the SEE
saturates once Pmax is beyond a threshold according to Figure
1. We increase the number d1 of data streams to 4 in the second
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Fig. 1: Average SEE vs. Pmax for d1 = 3.
numerical example. The code rate is thus 4/12 = 1/3. For this
higher-code-rate case, the zero-forcing beamformers [9], [10]
are infeasible. Comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveals that
higher code-rate beamforming is also much better in terms of
SEE because it leads to greater freedom in designing Vj of
size 12× 4 for maximizing the SEE. In other words, the effect
of code rate diversity on the SEE is observed.
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Fig. 2: Average SEE vs. Pmax for d1 = 4.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a path-following computational procedure
for the beamformer design to maximize the energy efficiency of
a secure MU MIMO wireless communication system and have
also showed its potential in solving other important optimiza-
tion problems in secure and energy-efficient communications.
Simulation results have confirmed the superior performance of
the proposed method over the exiting techniques.
Acknowledgement. The authors thank Dr. H. H. Kha for
providing the computational code from [10].
APPENDIX
Theorem 1: For a given σ > 0, consider a function
f(X) = ln |Im + (X)2/σ|
in X ∈ Cm×n. Then for any X¯ ∈ Cm×n, it is true that
h(X) ≤ f(X) ≤ g(X) (19)
with the concave quadratic function
h(X) = al + 2<{〈X¯XH〉}/σ − 〈Bl, (X)2〉/σ (20)
and the convex quadratic function
g(X) = au + 〈Bu, (X)2〉/σ (21)
where al , f(X¯) − 〈(X¯)2〉/σ, 0  Bl , σ−1Im − (σIm +
(X¯)2)−1, and au , f(X¯) + 〈(Im + (X¯)2/σ)−1 − Im〉, 0 ≺
Bu , (Im + (X¯)2/σ)−1. Both functions h and g agree with f
at X¯ .
Proof. Due to space limitations, we provide only a sketch of
the proof. Rewrite f(X) = − ln |Im− (X)2/((X)2+σIm)−1|,
which is convex as a function in ((X)2, (X)2+σIm) [18]. Then
h(X) defined by (20) actually is the first order approximation
of this function at ((X¯)2, (X¯)2 + σIm), which is its minorant
at ((X¯)2, (X¯)2+σIm) [17], proving the first inequality in (19).
On the other hand, considering f as a concave function in (X)2,
g(X) defined by (21) is seen as its first order approximation at
(X¯)2 and thus is its majorant at (X¯)2 [17], proving the second
inequality in (19).
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